Bid arrivals of eBay auctions often exhibit "bid sniping", a phenomenon where "snipers" place their bids at the last moments of an auction. This is one reason why bid histories for eBay auctions tend to have sparse data in the middle and denser data both in the beginning and at the end of the auction. Time spacing of the bids is thus irregular and sparse. For nearly identical products that are auctioned repeatedly, one may view the price history of each of these auctions as realization of an underlying smooth stochastic process, the price process. While the traditional Functional Data Analysis (FDA) approach requires that entire trajectories of the underlying process are observed without noise, this assumption is not satisfied for typical auction data.
Introduction
eBay.com is today's biggest global online auction market place. It provides a convenient environment for millions of sellers and buyers to carry out real-time transactions on the internet. The fact that eBay makes complete auction information available to the public provides opportunities for researchers to analyze online bidding behavior. This may lead to improved transaction strategies, benefiting both sellers and bidders. Although there are millions of different auctioned products available on eBay at any moment, we only focus on online transactions of a similar or same type of product, auctioned under the same modalities (same duration setting and same billing currency (US dollars)) and during the same time period.
We refer to Jank & Shmueli (2005a) and Reddy & Dass (2006) for some prior functional data analysis approaches for online auction data; this previous work is largely based on approaches described in Ramsay & Silverman (2002 . The time spacing of the bids from each auction is usually sparse for long periods during the auction and often becomes very dense as the auction is approaching its end. This phenomenon, caused by bidders who place their bids at the last moment, when an auction is near its close, is known as sniping.
Since the auctioned products that we are interested in are very much alike, the corresponding realizations of the price process for these products at different auctions will be considered to be i.i.d., although at a more detailed level, some dependencies between auctions that are close in calendar time might be present. We ignore such possible dependencies in the following and make the assumption that the observed bids from each auction can be viewed as measurements of the realization of an underlying random smooth stochastic process, the price process.
Functional data analysis, and especially functional principal component modelling, provides useful tools for analyzing such data (see also Jank & Shmueli, 2006) . Traditional functional principal component analysis (FPCA) requires dense and regular design data.
Due to the high degree of data sparsity and time irregularity present in the auction data, it is therefore necessary to adjust this methodology. For this purpose, we adopt the principal analysis through conditional expectation (PACE) method that was developed in Yao et al. (2005) . This will allow us to recover price trajectories even if only one or two bids are available for a given auction, provided that the pooled timings of bids from all auctions included in the data form a dense grid. An alternative is to fit a functional random effects models (James et al., 2000; Rice & Wu, 2001) , which handles sparse functional data through a pre-specified function basis such as B-Splines.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the auction system on eBay.com. In Section 3, we review the methodology to recover individual trajectories by the PACE method, which will be applied to the estimation of both log price process and the log price ratio process. In a modified approach, we adapt PACE to summarize the bid history at varying current times during an ongoing auction, providing time-varying principal component scores. These can be used to predict the closing price while an auction is still ongoing, providing instant updates when a new bid is registered during an ongoing auction. In Section 4, we illustrate the methods with data for 158 Palm M515 PDA auctions. We also present the prediction of the closing price for each auction using linear regression and generalized additive models, with the time-varying functional principal component scores as predictors. Other issues such as monotonicity of the fitted price curves will be briefly discussed.
Online auctions at eBay.com
The most common auctions on eBay are single-item auctions, which are organized as secondprice auctions, in which bidders submit confidential bids and the bidder who first offers the highest bid wins the auction. However, the winning bidder is only obliged to pay the secondhighest bid. Dutch auctions are used by eBay in the multiple item case, where the price starts out high as set by the seller and drops until someone wins the item. In this paper, we only consider the single-item auction case.
The major source of eBay's revenue is generated through auction listings and selling fees. All sellers are charged a nonrefundable Insertion Fee to enter the auction listing, with the amount depending on the starting price or reserve price (fully refundable if an item is sold) of an item. If an item is sold successfully, the seller is also charged a Final Value Fee, the amount depending on a certain percentage of the closing price. Moreover, eBay offers a list of optional features, such as Buy It Now, eBay Picture Services Fees etc., for sellers to enhance their listings for a fee. A seller can choose the listing duration to be either 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days. Here, we consider 7-day auctions only, the most popular auction for single-item listings.
eBay uses an automatic bidding system for the single-item auctions that we consider here. Bidders enter the maximum amount they are willing to pay for the item, the so-called WTP (willing-to-pay) values or proxy bids. Current price, the real-time price displayed in eBay's web page is referred to as live bid by Jank & Shmueli (2005b) . This price plays a key role in the decision-making for any bidder participating in an auction, since any new WTP values are required to be no less than the current price plus the pre-set bid increment corresponding to the current price. During the auction, eBay places new bids on behalf of a bidder according to the pre-set bid increment table, so that the bidder can bid against other bidder's maximum bid, until his or her WTP value is reached. The WTP values form the bid history and they are viewable to other bidders in an ongoing auction. However, the real time highest WTP value is always displayed the same as the current price, while the actual current highest WTP value can be higher but it is not disclosed to other bidders until the initiation of another higher WTP value from a different bidder, with the exception that the winner's WTP value is always kept confidential to other parties. eBay stores the completed listings for all auctions that ended over the past 15 days and they are available to any registered eBay user. The completed listings contain useful reference information for sellers and bidders. The listing for each auction contains a detailed bid history which includes: description of the item, item number, closing price, quantity of items auctioned, number of proxy bids received during the auction, and the WTP values (except for the winner's proxy bid), displayed in descending order, along with the corresponding bidder information, date and time.
It is important to observe that because the actual highest WTP value at any given time is hidden from other bidders during an auction, it is common that some of the earlier WTP values are higher than some later WTP values. For instance, assume the live bid for an auction is currently $30. Suppose Bidder A is currently the highest WTP value holder, say at $50. Because the amount of WTP $50 is invisible to other bidders, Bidder B joins the auction and places $35 as his or her WTP value, causes the current price to jump to $35 (the second highest WTP) + 1 (the bid increment corresponding to $35) = $36, that is, the system would now show the current price as $36 and Bidder B has been outbid. Therefore, although the live bids themselves are monotone increasing over an auction, the corresponding WTP values often are not monotone.
From the data collection point of view, the WTP values are much easier to obtain than the real-time live bids, since the complete bid history of any eBay auction that ended in any prior 15 day period can be searched and retrieved from the publicly available eBay web pages. During an ongoing auction, the live bid (or current price) is displayed dynamically as a single number in eBays's auction web page. This number increases whenever there is an update on the second highest WTP value for the auction. Information from eBay is needed to obtain the entire live bid history for any completed auction. However, even without access to this information, one can recover almost all live bids from the WTP information available in the bid history, by making use of the bid increment table which is defined at eBay 1 .
The one exception of an auction characteristic about which information cannot be recovered, to the best of our knowledge, is the presence of a secret reserve price for a given auction; it appears that the completed listings from eBay do not contain information about the existence of this feature of an auction and it is only viewable by the bidders in an on-going auction listing. If an auction indeed features a secret reserve price, the converted live bids will differ from the actual live bids by at most one record, namely a live bid where the secret reserve price has come into effect. As an example, assume an auction contains a secret reserve price of $100. Suppose the current live bid is $80 with the highest WTP value being $90 by Bidder A. Now, Bidder B comes in with a WTP of $120. eBay's automatic bidding system will institute a special price jump due to the secret reserve price, that is, the live bid will jump to $100, while without the presence of special reserve, it would have 1 http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/bid-increments.html been $90 (the second highest WTP) + $1 (the bid increment corresponding to $90) = $91.
However, the next converted bid will no longer be influenced by the secret reserve price, so only this one-time increment of the live bid will differ from the value it would have had in the absence of a secret reserve price. Continuing this example, an incoming Bidder C will be prompted by the eBay system to enter a WTP value that is $100 or more. Suppose Bidder C enters $105, then the converted bid will be $105 (the second highest WTP) + $2.50 (the bid increment corresponding to $105) = $107.50, which is the correct converted live bid even if during the conversion of the data from WTP values to live bids it is not known that a secret reserve price was present.
Since the secret reserve price feature is a costly option for sellers and the unknown size of the special price jump when the reserve is met is potentially discouraging for bidders participating in such auctions, this feature is used more often in auctions of relatively expensive products. The auction data in this paper was collected from WTP values, and in the absence of knowledge about the presence of a secret reserve, the converted live bids can be assumed to reflect the price process reasonably well. We will further discuss details of the conversion of auction bids from WTP to live bids in the case study section. From now on, "bids" is used as a synonym for "live bids".
Functional Methods for Sparse Auction Data

Recovering longitudinal trajectories through Functional Principal Component Analysis
The observed sequence of live bids is assumed to be generated by realizations of an underlying smooth random function, denoted as price process X(·), where X is a square integrable function, defined on a domain T , which is closed and bounded. The price process X is assumed to have unknown smooth mean function EX(t) = µ(t) ∈ L 2 , and unknown smooth covariance function cov(X(s), X(t)) = G(s, t) ∈ L 2 , s, t ∈ T . The covariance function G(s, t) is assumed to have an orthogonal expansion with non-increasing eigenvalues λ k and eigenfunctions φ k of the autocovariance operator A G , defined by
for any f in L 2 . Since G is symmetric and non-negative definite, this linear operator in the Hilbert space L 2 (T ) is a Hilbert-Schmidt operator (see Courant & Hilbert, 1953) . The orthogonal expansion of G is
and the Karhunen-Loève representation (Ash & Gardner, 1975; Rice & Silverman, 1991 ) of a random trajectory X i is then given by:
Here, the
and Eξ 2 ik = λ k , where k λ k < ∞ and λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0. In other words, the FPCs form a sequence of uncorrelated random variables with decreasing variances which are given by the eigenvalues.
In practice, the sequence of observed bids differs from the values of the smooth underlying trajectory, and the differences correspond to a "measurement error". In the case of auction data, these differences are best interpreted as random aberrations of prices around the smooth underlying price trajectory, rather than as physical measurement errors. Let T ij be time points at which bids are placed for price trajectory X i , where i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n i and T ij ∈ T . The number of bids n i observed for trajectory X i (i.e., the i-th auction) is assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable, independent of other random variables.
With an additive measurement error assumption (see also Rice & Wu, 2001 ), equation (3) can be connected with actual bids Y ij observed at times T ij through
where the ε ij denote the aberrations of the bids from the underlying smooth trajectories, assumed to be i.i.d. with mean 0 and constant variance σ 2 , and such that ε ij is independent of ξ ik for all i, k.
Identifying the components of (4) starts with the nonparametric estimation of mean and covariance function, following the proposal in Yao et al. (2005) . We use local linear scatterplot smoothers for the mean function and local linear surface smoothers for the covariance function (see Fan & Gijbels, 1996) . By pooling all observed bids together, across all auctions, we obtain the estimated mean functionμ(t) through minimizing
with respect to β 0 and β 1 , whereμ(t) =β 0 (t), t ∈ T . Here K 1 (·) is a univariate kernel function, usually chosen as a symmetric (around 0) density function. The necessary bandwidth h µ can be selected through leave-one-curve-out cross-validation (CV) (Rice & Silverman, 1991) or variants, such as generalized cross-validation (GCV). Often, a subjective choice through visualization is more adequate.
The assumptions about the bid aberrations ε ij present in model (4) imply that only the diagonal elements of the covariance are affected, as
where δ jl is the Kronecker delta. For "raw covariances"
and this motivates smoothing the raw covariances while omitting the diagonal terms. LetĜ(s, t) be a smooth estimate of the covariance surface, for example obtained by minimizing
with respect to β 0 , β 11 and β 12 , where the surface estimate isĜ(s, t) =β 0 (s, t), s, t ∈ T , according to the local least squares method. Here K 2 (·, ·) is a bivariate density, and usually one chooses the smoothing parameters such that
Similarly to the situation for the mean, bandwidths h G can be selected through CV, GCV or visually.
Estimating eigenfunctions and eigenvalues in model (4) corresponds to finding the solutionsφ k andλ k of the eigen-equations,
where theφ k are subject to Tφ k (t) 2 dt = 1 and Tφ k (t)φ m (t)dt = 0 for m = k. The estimated eigenvalues and eigenfunctions are then obtained by spectral decomposition of the discretized smoothed covariance (Rice & Silverman, 1991; Capra & Müller, 1997) .
Traditional FPCA uses numerical integration to estimate the FPC scores
For price trajectories X i , the estimated FPC scores via the integration method
, with T i,j−1 = 0, assuming the T ij are ordered by size. This method requires the observed bids to be dense and regularly spaced, and recorded without aberrations from the price trajectories. In this situation, Y ij = X ij .
However, this estimator suffers seriously if the observed bids are noisy, sparse or irregularly spaced.
As an alternative to numerical integration, Yao et al. (2003) proposed a shrinkage estimator to estimate the ξ ik for dense and noisy data with missing values. The PACE method developed by Yao et al. (2005) aims at the estimation of ξ ik for sparse, irregularly observed and noisy data, and thus provides a natural approach for the auction data.
Here we give a brief overview of some pertinent details. Let
and assume
ξ ik and ε ij in (4) are jointly Gaussian. The best prediction of the k-th FPC score ξ ik of X i , given the observed bids for this price trajectory, is the conditional expectation, which is (Yao et al. (2005) )
where
and µ i , the estimates for the predicted ξ ik then becomê
where the (j, l) th element ofΣ
Here,Ĝ(T ij , T il ) can be estimated from (6) andσ 2 is estimated as described in equation (2) of Yao et al. (2005) .
The idea for the estimate ofσ 2 is simply to compare a smoothed version of just the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix with the diagonal of the resulting surface estimate along the direction perpendicular to the diagonal of the covariance matrix. Under the Gaussian assumption, the estimator (9) targets the best prediction, however not the actual values of the FPC scores. Assuming the major modes of variation of the infinitedimensional price processes X i correspond to the first K eigenfunctions, then the estimate for the predicted price trajectory X i iŝ
To select a reasonable number of K eigenfunctions to approximate the infinite-dimensional process, one can compute the one-curve leave-out score (Rice & Silverman, 1991) , aiming at minimizing the leave-one-curve-out prediction error
. . , n i , are the predicted bids for price trajectory X i . These values are estimated after removing the data for the trajectory X i itself, where the estimated mean function and eigenfunctions are evaluated at the observed bid times for this trajectory.
The construction of the cross-validation score for a given number of K components involves fitting model (4) n-times, which can be computationally expensive when n is large.
Moreover, in practice, the final choice of K by the CV method tends to be large and often unstable as CV does not sufficiently restrict the degrees of freedom. As an alternative to the CV method, Yao et al. (2005) proposed AIC (Shibata, 1981) and BIC (Schwarz, 1978) type of criteria based on a pseudo-Gaussian log-likelihood, computed conditionally on the
Criteria for the selection of K are minimizing either AIC(
Note that for each given K one may compute AIC(K) or BIC(K) by fitting the model (4) once only, which is computationally more efficient than the CV method.
In practice, we found the choices obtained from these criteria to be reasonable and usually better than CV. In addition to the above criteria, choice of K by means of a scree plot is relatively simple and often quite adequate. To construct a scree plot, one needs to fit a model with a relatively large number of FPCs, say M components, so that λ M is close to zero. Next, one plots λ k against k for k = 1, . . . , M . The idea is to choose the number K such that eigenvalues beyond λ K can be ignored in terms of the fraction of additional variance they would explain.
The proportion of variation left unexplained by the truncated expansion in (10) can be defined as
and is estimated by plugging in eigenvalue estimates. The selected K will be a point where ideally, the function V (K) starts to flatten after an initial decline. The estimators in model (4) are shown to be asymptotically consistent under mild conditions in Yao et al. (2005) , where also asymptotic point-wise and simultaneous confidence bands for the predicted individual trajectories are derived.
Analyzing evolving bid trajectories
For nearly identical products that are auctioned repeatedly over a given period of time under similar auction settings (such as same duration of an auction, same currency in use etc.), one can model the bid history for each auction as "price process" using the FDA approach as described in the previous section, under the assumption that these auctions are independent of each other.
Through the PACE method, one may recover the price trajectory for each online auction.
Sometimes the trajectories underlying a bid history observed up to a current time t of an ongoing auction are of particular interest, especially for online applications where an auction has been incompletely observed but one aims at characterizing the ongoing auction at an intermediate time. The PACE method can be readily adapted to this setting.
Let t, where 0 < t < T , be the current length of time an auction has been running, where
is the domain of the price process and the auction is assumed to begin at time 0.
Then the price process for an auction observed up to time t is denoted by X(s, t), 0 ≤ s ≤ t (see also Müller & Zhang, 2005) . The corresponding mean and covariance function are (i) EX(s, t) = µ(s, t), with µ(s, t) = µ(s) for s ≤ t, and (ii) cov(X(s 1 , t), X(s 2 , t)) = G t (s 1 , s 2 ),
, where λ 1t ≥ λ 2t ≥ . . . ≥ 0 are eigenvalues and φ 1t (·), φ 2t (·), . . . , are orthonormal eigenfunctions of the autocovariance operator A Gt . The eigenvalues and eigenfunctions correspond to the solution of the eigen-
Then the Karhunen-Loève representation of price trajectory of X i up to time t corresponds to
where ξ ikt = t 0 {X i (s, t) − µ(s, t)}φ kt (s)ds, the FPC for the trajectory X i in [0, t]. As usual, we have E(ξ ikt ) = 0 and E(ξ ikt ξ ik t ) = 0 for k = k and E(ξ 2 ikt ) = λ kt with k λ kt < ∞. The bids again may be viewed as contaminated values of the price trajectory as above, and estimation follows the same principles as described in section 3.1, with the modification that the input data (or observed bids) Y ijt are restricted to T ij ∈ [0, t] only. As t varies, one thus obtains a time-varying version of the PACE method, which provides continuous updates for the characteristics of the price process as it evolves over time.
Predicting closing price through bid histories
In addition to modeling the evolution of price trajectories for each auction, we are also interested in predicting the final price using currently available bid information at each time t, 0 < t < T . More specifically, instead of using only a current bid at or near time t as a predictor, we aim at relating the closing price of an auction, i.e., the value of the price process at time T , to the entire price process from 0 to current time t. The underlying rationale for this approach is that the price history contains much richer information than current price alone.
If price processes are well approximated by projecting on the function space spanned by the first K eigenfunctions, it suffices to use the first K time-varying functional principal component scores ξ kt to represent trajectories (price processes) X i up to current time t.
We may assume various regression models with the final price Y * as response and ξ kt as predictors. For example, Hastie & Tibshirani (1993) proposed a series of varying coefficient generalized linear models for cross-sectional data, while Hoover et al. (1998) and Fan & Zhang (1999 , 2000 considered modelling varying-coefficient functions for longitudinal data.
When g t (·), the time-varying link function, is chosen as the identity function, the varying coefficient linear model becomes
where Y * is assumed to be an independent Gaussian random variable, the varying intercept function β 0t is the mean of the price function at time t, the ξ kt are the uncorrelated individual random components with zero mean, and β kt are the corresponding varying coefficients for ξ kt . The least squares estimates of the varying coefficients of β t = (β 0t , . . . , β Kt ) T will be usually obtained for each t,ˆ β t = argmin βt
The predicted final price for an auction with price process X i (s), s ≤ t is then
A varying coefficient generalized additive model (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990 ) provides a flexible alternative to predict the final price. Under the identity link, model (14) becomes
where the f kt (·) are unknown smooth functions with Ef kt (ξ kt ) = 0 and the predicted final
There are currently two available R packages which provide estimation for model (16) with various link functions. One is the gam package (author: Trevor Hastie) which uses the local scoring algorithm and iteratively fits the weighted additive models by backfitting.
An alternative version is the mgcv package (author: Simon Woods) which estimates the unknown functions through penalized iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) (see Wood, 2000) , with a focus on automatic smoothing parameter choice via GCV. For any fixed t, model (17) involves the estimation ofβ 0t and of the unknown functionsf kt . Since we are interested in fitting many models with varying values of t, the automatic bandwidth choice of mgcv is an attractive feature, and this version was selected for our applications.
To assess goodness-of-fit for models (14) and (16), one can use the mean square prediction error function,
As t moves closer to the auction end time T , theξ ikt contain more and more information about the auction; thus, MSPE is expected to be monotone falling as t increases, apart from random fluctuations. We will illustrate this feature for the Palm M515 PDA auction example in the case study section below.
4 Case study
Preprocessing of data on Personal Digital Assistant auctions
The data used in this paper was collected by Wolfgang Jank (iii) any other current live bid is equal to current second highest WTP value plus the bid increment corresponding to this price, as discussed above, with the constraint that the sum will not exceed the current highest WTP value; (iv) any non-increasing live bids causing by new update(s) from the current highest WTP value holder will be excluded; (v) the closing price is the same as the winner's bid (the converted live bid corresponding to the second last WTP value). The conversion relies on the assumption that no secret reserve price is present in any of the auctions. We will discuss this assumption below. One auction that did not contain any information about the bidder ID was excluded, since rule (iv) can't be applied in this case. We further removed another auction that contained identical bids of the same value ($199) placed by the same and only bidder for the auction, and the analysis reported here is therefore based on 156 auctions.
The start of all auctions is recalibrated to time 0, so that the first day of an auction ends after 24 hrs, and all auctions end at the end of day 7, corresponding to 168 hrs. Although the recorded bid time is accurate up to seconds, we converted the time unit into hours, that is, the time domain is between 0 and 168 hours for all auctions. Since the difference between the minimum bid ($0.01) and the maximum bid ($283.50 ) is large, we decided to transform the bids to the log-scale, which leads to live bid values ranging from -4.61 and 5.65 and also brings the price data closer to Gaussianity which is required for the predictions of individual trajectories in the PACE method. The analysis is therefore implemented for the log price process.
Analysis of log-bids
We begin the analysis by applying the PACE method to model the log price process for each auction on time domain t ij ∈ [0, 168) (time units in hours), for auctions indexed by i = 1, . . . , 156 and bids indexed by j = 1, . . . , n i . Though the closing prices for each auction were recorded, we only used the live bids that were registered before the end of the 168 th hour (the end of day 7) as input data.
The number of live bids per auction ranged from 9 to 52. Figure 1 shows the boxplot of the daily number of aggregated bids from all 156 auctions, based on the 7-day scale. The median number of bids placed on the first day of an auction was 3 and then it dropped to and stayed at 1 for the second and third day. On day 4, the median number of bids per auction fell to essentially zero, follow by a small increase on day 5, where the median number of bids per auction rose to 1. On day 6, this number climbed to 2 and it shot up rapidly to 9 on day 7, the last day of an auction. The highly irregular spacing of the times when bids were recorded reflects high variability of bidding behavior and the sniping phenomenon described earlier.
When modelling individual price trajectories, the classical FPCA approach does not work well for the estimation of the principal component scores, due to the difficulties caused by the irregular bid times for the numerical integration step. The PACE method however allows recovery of individual trajectories, as long as the pooled bid times over all auctions are dense in the domain, and also all pairs of bid times are dense on the domain squared; both assumptions are satisfied for the auction data. To model log price processes, we assume the observed bids are contaminated by aberrations which are added to the underlying smooth log price trajectories. As mentioned before, no secret reserve price is included in the modeling for any of the auctions, and should this assumption be violated for some of the auctions, the resulting bid conversion error will simply correspond to one of the bid aberrations that our model allows for.
As a first step in the analysis of the auction data, we pooled all bids together and used (5) to estimate the mean function for the log price trajectories (using the Epanechnikov kernel as weight function K 1 ). The bandwidth choices resulting from both one-curve-leaveout CV or GCV appeared to be undersmoothing, and we therefore augmented them through visual assessment. We found h µ = 12hr to provide a reasonable fit for the mean function, which can be seen in the top right corner of Figure 3 . The bids aggregated from all auctions are displayed as grey dots and the estimated mean function is shown overlaid as a solid black curve. On average, log prices are seen to increase rapidly around the first day of an auction and then the increases taper off until the final phase of an auction.
Next, we use (6) to obtain the estimated smooth covariance function for the log price trajectories. Here the input data are the raw covariances obtained by pooling all auction data together and removing the diagonal elements which are contaminated by bid aberrations.
The bivariate kernel in (6) is chosen as the product of two one-dimensional Epanechnikov kernels. Bandwidth choices obtained from CV appeared to be undersmoothing while the GCV bandwidths (42hr, 42hr) were found adequate. We then apply spectral decomposition to the smooth covariance function at a pre-selected time grid to obtain estimated eigenvalues and eigenfunctions, the latter defined on this time grid. The estimated predictions for the FPC scores were then computed via (9).
In the spectral decomposition step, it is crucial to determine a reasonable number K of included components, representing the relevant modes of variation of the log price trajectories. Choices from CV, AIC or BIC were found to be too large. As an alternative selection tool we applied the scree plot approach based on fraction of variance explained (12) to determine K. It turned out that the choice K = 3 (out of M = 20) was satisfactory, as the first 3 components accounted for 97.65% of total variation. The resulting estimated eigenfunctions can be seen in the last column of Figure 3 . The first eigenfunction (72.69% of total variation) represents an overall trend and has a similar shape as the mean function.
The second eigenfunction (22.44% of total variation) increases sharply in the first 3 days and then declines slowly afterwards. This component may represent the dynamics of early price increments, up to mid-auction. The third eigenfunction (2.52% of total variation) increases in the first 2 days, followed by a decrease in the next 2 days, and then by a slow increase until the end of auction. Figure 2 demonstrates the obtained fits for 16 estimated log price trajectories corresponding to 16 randomly selected auctions. The trajectories were fitted through (10) with K = 3. Overall, the price trajectories fit the data reasonably well. As the observed bids are monotone increasing within an auction, we might assume the same holds for the log price process. The PACE method does not enforce such a constraint in the estimation procedure and the fitted log price trajectories are not guaranteed to be monotone increasing. For example, the four graphs in the bottom panel display cases of non-monotone fitted log price curves. The estimated trajectories from PACE are displayed as broken lines. A simple device to monotonize the log price trajectories is to apply the "Pooled-Adjacent-Violators
Algorithm" (PAVA), as introduced in Barlow et al. (1972) , to the fitted curves obtained from the PACE method. Any non-increasing estimated bids will be successively pooled to-gether with their adjacent values and replaced by the average of the pooled values until no more non-monotone estimated bids are encountered. The R function isoreg() is one of the implementations of the PAVA algorithm and is used here to obtain the monotonized curves for the four auctions shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2 . The monotonized trajectories are displayed as solid black lines in the graphs. The flat line segments in each of these graphs reflect the PAVA averaged values of the estimated bids for non-monotone segments.
For further discussion of PAVA in the context of nonparametric smoothing methods we refer to Friedman & Tibshirani (1984) .
To further study the auction dynamics, we also applied the time-varying PACE method (13), choosing various current times t. For demonstration purposes, we illustrate the evolution of mean and the first eigenfunction for the log price processes based on bid histories observed up to current times t = 24hr, 72hr and 120hr, as illustrated in Figure 3 . The estimated mean functions are shown in the graphs of the top panel. The bandwidth choices for the mean functions were h µ = 11hr, 9hr, 9hr, respectively for the three times, via visual choice. From these graphs, we find that the estimated mean function for log prices increases sharply within the first day (t ≤ 24hr) of an auction and it then flattens as time progresses, as seen from the graphs for t ≤ 72hr (day 3) and t ≤ 120hr (day 5). The first 3 estimated eigenfunctions are displayed in the next three rows of Figure 3 . They were obtained from the spectral decomposition of the three estimated covariance surfaces, choosing bandwidths h G = 11hr (visually), 18hr (GCV), and 30hr (GCV), respectively. For each time t, the first three eigenfunctions explain about 96 ∼ 97% of the total variation, with the first eigenfunction explaining about 70%, the second about 20%, and the third about 3 ∼ 5% (except for t ≤ 24hr, which is about 8%). The evolution of all eigenfunctions is smooth and gives rise to similar interpretations as for the fits over the entire time domain of an auction.
One of the advantages of the time-varying PACE method is that one can summarize the bid history up to a current time t via the time-varying FPC scores and then use these scores as predictors for the closing price. We implemented such a scheme and obtained timevarying FPCs for the bid histories observed up to 24, . . . , 168 hours. All bandwidths were selected through GCV and the number of included components (FPC scores) through AIC, which led to an average of about 10 included components. To predict closing price from bid histories to current time t, we compared two regression models with closing price as response and the time-varying FPC scores as predictors. One model was a linear regression using lm() in R for (15). As a nonlinear alternative, we also fitted a Generalized Additive Model (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990 ) (gam()) using the mgcv package in R for (17). The unknown smooth functions f j are estimated through cubic smoothing splines and the smoothing parameters chosen by GCV. To check the goodness-of-fit of the time-varying predictions, we use (18) to calculate the MSPE for different current times t. The results are shown in 
Analysis of log price increments
As an alternative to modelling log price processes, we also considered modelling the log price increment processes. Here the observed log bid ratios will be used as input data, rather than log bid values. We removed any observed bids that fell below $1 (inclusive) or
were not strictly larger than previous bids. All second live bids fall into this category, since they are the same as the opening bids. If Y ij is a bid observed at time T ij ∈ [0, 168) (time in hours) and Y ij > 1, we define the log bid ratios as
with Y i0 ≡ 1, i = 1, . . . , 156, j = 1, . . . , n i .
Then q i1 = log Y i1 so that the first ratio is relative to $1.
The analysis and estimation procedures follow exactly those described for the log price processes in section 4.2, substituting responses q ij for Y ij . The resulting estimated mean function for the log price ratio processes is shown in the top left corner of Figure 6 with h µ = 12hr (chosen visually). Unsurprisingly, the estimated mean function for the log price increment is positive throughout, since the observed bids are monotone increasing. The log bid increments are largest in the beginning and drop off sharply after the first day, after which they continue to decrease mildly. Eigenfunctions are again obtained through spectral decomposition of the smooth covariance surface with h G = 12hr (chosen visually). The scree plot approach indicates that choice of K = 2 or 3 components is adequate.
The resulting estimated eigenfunctions are displayed in Figure 6 . The fractions of total variation that is explained by the first three eigenfunctions are 89.33%, 5.77% and 2.89%, respectively. The shape of the first eigenfunction is very similar to the mean function. The second eigenfunction first decreases in the first two days and then slowly increases. The third eigenfunction declines rapidly in the first day, followed by a large increase during the second day and it then flattens. The estimated log price ratio trajectories for the same selected auctions as those shown in Figure 2 are illustrated in Figure 5 , based on three FPCs.
Note that the estimated trajectories fit the data reasonably well, even with the relatively small number of repeated measurements (observed log bid ratios) per auction. The log bid increments appear to be largest up to the first or second day and then become almost zero.
It appears that the effect of different opening prices is attenuated after the second day of the auction. We conclude from this analysis that the log price process itself contains more information about the overall online auction dynamics than does the increment process which mainly reflects the dynamics at the beginning of an auction.
Conclusions and discussion
We show how a recent FPCA approach that is designed for the recovery of trajectories from sparse, irregular and noisy longitudinal repeated measurements can be easily adapted to auction data. The implementation of this approach through the PACE method is found to be useful to fit log price processes and log bid ratio processes. Especially the fits for the log price process and the associated eigenfunctions provide interesting insights into the time dynamics of online auctions. Adding a PAVA step easily leads to monotonized fitted trajectories. Alternative monotonized versions with more smoothness could be obtained by coupling PACE with other recent monotonization methods (e.g., Hall & Huang (2001) ) and connecting such methods with PACE provides a topic for future research.
In addition to studying online auction dynamics, prediction of the closing price is clearly an important aspect. In section 3.3, we consider the concept of time-varying FPC scores, which summarize the bid history from the beginning to current time t of an auction. This is a particularly attractive feature for online auctions, because one usually has to make a decision at a current time t, based on available information about the auction history to time t. As we show, prediction based on these scores works well and can be computed for an arbitrary current time t. Our results from the case study indicate that the time-varying GAM provides good predictions and performs uniformly better than prediction by multiple linear regression.
There are many possible extensions of these approaches. For example, one can study the inclusion of other variables that are involved in an online auction. These can be time- 
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